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Replicability Crisis in Social Psychology: Looking at the 
Past to Find New Pathways for the Future
Wojciech Świątkowski and Benoît Dompnier
Over the last few years, psychology researchers have become increasingly preoccupied with the question 
of whether findings from psychological studies are generally replicable. The debates have originated from 
some unfortunate events of scientific misconduct in the field, and they have reached a climax with the 
recent discovery of a relatively weak rate of replicability of published literature, leading to the so-called 
replicability crisis in psychology. 
The present paper is concerned with examining the issue of replicability in the field of social  psychology. 
We begin by drawing a state of the art of the crisis in this field. We then highlight some possible causes 
for the crisis, discussing topics of statistical power, questionable research practices, publication  standards, 
and hidden auxiliary assumptions of context-dependency of social psychological theories. Finally, we argue 
that given the absence of absolute falsification in science, social psychology could greatly benefit from 
adopting McGuire’s perspectivist approach to knowledge construction.
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What does it mean to do good research? How do we define 
criteria of research quality? Arguably, the answer may be 
twofold. On the one hand, one can define research quality 
from a purely scientific and methodological  standpoint, 
with reference to validity of drawn conclusions and 
 contribution to existing knowledge. Here, the standard of 
quality is defined with reference to internal, external, and 
construct validity (cf. Brewer & Crano, 2014)  associated 
with studied psychological effects. On the other hand, 
one can also adopt a more evaluative perspective and 
judge the quality of a given piece of research based on 
the  reputation of the journal in which it was published. 
The assumption underlying this point of view is that the 
more prestigious the outlet, the better the research is con-
sidered. The goal of empirical science is to discover truths 
about the world using scientific methodology, the quality 
of which can be assessed solely with reference to the first 
definition. In practice, however, many of the decisions 
that guide  scientists’ careers in academia (e.g., grant attri-
butions, hiring process) are based on the second stand-
ard of research quality. This twofold definition of research 
quality creates incentives that are often conflicting for 
researchers: striving for research validity on one hand, 
and research publishability on the other (Nosek, Spies, & 
Motyl, 2012).
The reality is that the better a journal’s reputation 
– based on indices such as the journal impact factor 
(Garfield, 2006) – the harsher the competition to  publish 
in this journal becomes. The spirit of competitiveness 
could somehow relate to the quality of research being 
published in a positive way, for instance, by favoring 
papers of the highest scientific validity. However, strong 
competition associated with the publication process may 
also promote the search for “perfect data” (Giner-Sorolla, 
2012), thereby encouraging a variety of questionable 
practices (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Kerr, 1998; 
Schimmack, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2011) that ultimately cast doubts on the validity of 
what is being published and the reproducibility of such 
findings.
For the last few years, psychology researchers have 
become increasingly preoccupied with the question of 
whether the findings that are typically published in the 
literature are replicable. As a matter of fact, two spe-
cial issues in high-level journals have recently been 
devoted to discussing this so far neglected topic (Pashler 
& Wagenmakers, 2012; Stangor & Lemay Jr., 2016). 
Undoubtedly, this heightened interest follows the recent 
debates that called into question conventional practices 
of research conduct and data analysis (e.g., Ioannidis, 
2005). Especially impactful was the recent collaborative 
Psychology Reproducibility Project led by Brian Nosek 
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015), which indicated that 
many – if not the majority of – published findings in 
 psychology are indeed not replicable.
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The present paper is concerned with the so-called 
 replicability crisis in psychology that originated over 
the last few years, with a focus on social psychology. To 
begin with, we will present a state of the art of the  current 
crisis in replicability and confidence in the field. Next, 
we will review causes that may have produced such a 
 phenomenon. Specifically, we will first discuss the issue 
of low statistical power in psychological studies. Then, 
we will cover matters related to questionable research 
practices and current publication standards. Finally, we 
will address the issue of hidden assumptions of context-
dependency of social psychological effects and discuss the 
potential of perspectivism – an epistemological approach 
to scientific discovery developed by William McGuire 
(1983, 1989, 1999, 2004) – on social psychology.
Social Psychology: A Field in Confidence Crisis
About five years ago, social psychology entered a cycle of 
unfortunate events that considerably undermined both 
the reputation of the field and the confidence in the 
knowledge it produced. Undoubtedly, the first event to 
mention was the discovery of high-profile cases of out-
right fraud (Crocker & Cooper, 2011), such as Diederik 
Stapel’s case. This scholar admitted to having intention-
ally fabricated data over a dozen years, which eventually 
resulted in retracting more than 50 published papers. 
At the time, this incident could only have added some 
extra fuel to the already burning fire that was caused by 
the publication of some surprising findings in one of the 
top outlets in social psychology. Bem (2011) published an 
article presenting nine experimental studies in which he 
made a  controversial claim about the existence of extra-
sensory perception, according to which individuals could 
experience a sense of future events before they would 
even occur. This article had been considered as conform-
ing to scientific standards (Judd & Gawronski, 2011). Such 
an attitude was interpreted by many as the sign that these 
very standards are flawed at the outset and therefore 
“allow” the publication of too many findings that are actu-
ally false positives (e.g., Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, 
& van der Maas, 2011). Ultimately, the original effect failed 
to be replicated by other researchers (Galak,  LeBoeuf, 
 Nelson, & Simmons, 2012). Yet, this episode raised  serious 
questions about the way researchers in psychology  analyze 
and report their data (e.g., Simmons et al., 2011).
Furthermore, John et al. (2012) assessed the  prevalence 
of questionable research practices among academic 
 psychologists and found that the occurrence of these 
were quite high. For instance, among the 2,155 respond-
ents to their survey, almost 56 percent admitted to having 
decided to collect more data after seeing that the initial 
test was not statistically significant, and nearly 46 per-
cent admitted to having selectively reported studies that 
“worked” in a paper to be published. Last but not least, 
methodologists have also highlighted a prevalent issue 
of misreporting statistical analyses in published articles 
(Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Nuijten, Hartgerink, van Assen, 
Epskamp, & Wicherts, 2015). For instance, Nuijten et al. 
(2015) reported that in a sample of more than 30,000 
 articles selected from the top eight psychology journals, 
one in eight possibly contained an inconsistent p-value 
that might have affected the statistical conclusion.
Taken as a whole, one can wonder to what extent the 
conclusions published in the psychological literature are 
scientifically valid and sound. Given that one of the key 
features that defines the scientific quality of a proposed 
claim is reproducibility, the effects that are published 
should be more than likely replicable. Until recently, rep-
licating existing studies has been no more than just a rare 
phenomenon in psychological science (Schmidt, 2009). 
Indeed, Makel, Plucker, and Hegarty (2012) estimated the 
rate of replicated studies in the field to be as low as 1.07 
percent. 
Recently, however, a substantial collaborative research 
effort – the Psychology Reproducibility Project – was 
deployed to assess the extent to which one could replicate 
psychological effects from the published literature (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015). Independent research teams 
attempted to replicate 100 published effects from various 
fields of psychology. The results seemed to be somewhat 
in line with what one might have expected based on the 
above review: Only 39 percent of findings were consid-
ered to be successfully replicated. Regarding the effects 
specifically from the field of social psychology that were 
under scrutiny, only 25 percent were replicated. Likewise, 
other widely known effects from the social psychological 
literature, such as ego-depletion (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998) or unconscious behavioral 
 priming (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) were challenged 
in  replication studies that proved unsuccessful (Doyen, 
Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Hagger et al., 2016). 
While this state of affairs is certainly not one any  scientist 
would like to identify with, it should be viewed as an 
opportunity and as a strong incentive to reconsider some 
of the current practices that might lie at the origin of this 
crisis. In the sections below, we review practices that we 
deem to be the most relevant to the following question: 
why do so many published studies in  psychology fail to 
be replicated? Our ambition here is not to be exhaustive; 
our overview will rather aim to highlight some  credible 
answers.
The Important (Neglect of) Statistical Power
The first candidate answer to the question of why a 
 replication study would not succeed in finding an  original 
effect is statistical power, which refers to the  probability 
of correctly rejecting a tested hypothesis (in current 
 practices, H0). In other words, statistical power determines 
the chance when performing a test to declare an effect as 
“statistically significant” if the tested effect does genuinely 
exist. High statistical power is therefore a desirable prop-
erty one should seek to achieve and should be of greatest 
concern when designing a study. If a study is to address a 
research question appropriately, the minimal requirement 
is that it should have the means to detect a supposedly 
existing psychological effect. Stated otherwise,  running a 
study whose outcome is very likely to be negative at the 
outset – even though the effect under investigation truly 
exists – is clearly pointless and represents a waste of valu-
able research resources. 
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Power can be formally defined with reference to Type-II 
error, which is the decision of not rejecting the null 
hypothesis H0 when it is actually false. If ß refers to the 
long-term frequency of committing the Type-II error, then 
statistical power is defined as 1 – ß. Following widely 
accepted recommendations (e.g., Cohen, 1965; Maxwell, 
2004), 1 – ß should be at least as high as 0.80. With the 
power set at 0.80, running five studies assessing a true 
effect will on average yield four statistically significant 
results. Alternatively, statistical power can also be consid-
ered as a long-term p-value distribution (Cumming, 2012). 
If 1 – ß = 0.80, it then means that if one were to run 100 
replication studies of the exact same true effect, approxi-
mately 80 percent of these studies would yield a p-value 
significant at 0.05 level, and approximately 20 percent 
would yield a p-value comprised between 0.05 and 1 (see 
Cumming, 2012, p. 323). As statistical power is a function 
of the alpha level (long-term frequency of committing the 
Type-I error of rejecting H0 when it is true), sample size, 
and effect size (Keppel, 1991), it is possible to derive one 
when the other three are fixed. To increase power, one can 
increase the study’s sample size. 
Methodologists have long urged scientists to work 
 systematically with substantial sample sizes to draw infer-
ences from highly powered studies. These detect more 
reliable and stable effects and yield fewer false positives 
than those with lesser power (Cohen, 1962, 1990, 1992; 
Maxwell, 2004; Maxwell, Kelley, & Rausch, 2008). In other 
words, high-powered studies hold higher informational 
value than low-powered studies (see Lakens & Evers, 2014, 
for a review). All other things being equal, a significant 
effect from a high-powered study has a lower chance of 
being a false-positive finding than if it was obtained with a 
low-powered study. Likewise, a non-significant effect from 
a high-powered study has a lower chance to be a false-
negative than if it was obtained with lower power. 
Power is also particularly important in studies where 
measurement error is to be expected. Low-powered stud-
ies that assess “noisy effects” (i.e., where there are system-
atic random variations associated with the way variables 
are measured) can often yield overestimated effect sizes, 
whose achieved statistical significance capitalizes on 
 random error rather than on the true parameter value 
(Loken & Gelman, 2017). As it is reasonable to assume meas-
urement error to be present in psychological research, this 
should give an extra incentive to consider power issues 
so as to limit the proportion of published studies whose 
effect sizes are spuriously inflated. It is therefore recom-
mended to perform a priori power  analyses indicating the 
minimum sample size necessary to achieve a desirable 
level of statistical power when  designing a study.1 
Unfortunately, despite its crucial scientific importance 
and numerous efforts by leading methodologists in the 
field, statistical power has often been neglected and 
underused in social psychological science, leading to 
many low-powered studies whose chances of detecting 
an effect have been lower than one could get by literally 
flipping a coin (Cohen, 1990). Indeed, for years, system-
atic literature reviews have pointed out the issue of low 
statistical power across studies in psychology (Bakker, 
van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Maxwell, 2004; Rossi, 1990; 
Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989). Most likely, this state of 
affairs is due to the fact that researchers use sample sizes 
that are too small given the small effect sizes typical to 
the field (see Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 2003, for a 
review). Thus, with regard to the issue of the prevalence of 
unsuccessful replication studies, it is possible that some of 
these simply lacked the statistical power needed to prop-
erly detect the original effects (Maxwell, 2004; Tressoldi, 
2012). For instance, Tressoldi (2012) noted that out of six 
recent meta-analyses aimed at assessing the validity of 
controversial effects, four meta-analyses included studies 
with low and very low statistical power, ranging from 0.07 
to 0.55 levels.
However, as much as the statistical power of  replication 
studies is relevant for this issue, it cannot solely account for 
the low rate of replicability in social psychology in general. 
For instance, the mean power achieved in the Psychology 
Reproducibility Project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) 
was estimated to be 0.92, and the researchers expected to 
detect around 89 effects as  statistically  significant based 
on the 100 they tested, assuming these effects were true. 
This prediction scores far beyond the 25 percent of actu-
ally replicated findings, which indicates that the  statistical 
power of the replication studies is clearly not the only 
issue at stake. Yet, what about the original studies? As 
stated above, social psychological studies are frequently 
underpowered given the small effect sizes observed in 
the field. This likely inflates the rate of false-positive find-
ings in the published literature that are later unreplica-
ble (Forstmeier, Wagenmakers, & Parker, 2016; Ioannidis, 
2005; Lakens & Evers, 2014). 
In line with this argument, there seems to be an apparent 
inconsistency between the actual power typically achieved 
in psychological studies and their capacity to detect statis-
tically significant results (Francis, 2012; Schimmack, 2012). 
Specifically, Schimmack (2012) observed a substantial gap 
between the number of reported significant results in 
multiple study articles and their respective level of power. 
Indeed, testing several hypotheses in such research pro-
grams typically involves performing a high number of sta-
tistical tests. As noted by Maxwell (2004), increasing the 
number of statistical tests to be conducted decreases the 
overall probability of declaring all outcomes from those 
tests as statistically significant (i.e., their overall statisti-
cal power), even though the probability of finding at least 
one significant result increases. Consequently, many such 
published multi-study articles should theoretically yield 
fewer significant results, and the reported statistical tests 
should be consistent with their respective power level. In 
the following section, we will provide some explanations 
for this discrepancy, which will further account for the low 
rate of replicability among psychological studies.
Questionable Research Practices Cause 
Questionable Research Conclusions
Although even highly powered studies do not 
 demonstrate the absence of an effect when they fail the 
attempt of replication, they do raise the possibility that 
the effect under investigation might actually be a false 
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positive. Indeed, many research practices that have been 
 commonly deployed by the scientific community might 
be at the origin of false positives in the psychological 
literature. Practices that directly cause the Type-I error 
rate to inflate include the researcher’s degrees of freedom 
( Simmons et al., 2011), that is, all kinds of unjustifiable 
flexibility in data analysis, such as working with several 
undisclosed dependent variables, collecting more obser-
vations after initial hypothesis testing, stopping data 
collection earlier than planned because of a statistically 
 significant predicted finding, controlling for gender 
effects a posteriori, dropping experimental conditions, 
and so on. Likewise, other procedures known as p-hacking 
(undisclosed multiple testing without adjustments) and 
cherry picking ( dropping observations to reach a signifi-
cance level) lead to the same problematic consequences: 
using such techniques when analyzing data increases the 
Type-I long-term error rate, especially when applied in 
combination. For instance, combining three of the afore-
mentioned practices could inflate the alpha level to as 
high as 60 percent (see Simmons et al., 2011)! In practi-
cal terms, this means that more than half of the findings 
declared as “statistically significant” could be merely false 
positives. Simmons et al. (2011) illustrated the danger of 
such procedures by showing that one could literally find 
evidence for any claim, no matter how absurd, when using 
these questionable analytical practices, such as the find-
ing that listening to certain types of songs could change 
people’s actual age. To the extent that the p-value rep-
resents the long-term rate of false decisions of rejecting 
the null hypothesis H0, any procedure that changes this 
error rate should be adjusted for, if one wishes to keep 
the alpha level at the desired, conventional level of 0.05 
( Wagenmakers, 2007). 
Based on recent reports, the high prevalence of these 
questionable research practices among researchers could 
explain the abundance of false positives in the social 
 psychological literature (John et al., 2012). Unfortunately, 
the problem of a high rate of false positives in published 
articles is further galvanized by what Kerr (1998) described 
as “HARKing” (Hypothesizing after the results are known), 
a practice that casts serious doubt on the validity of 
 published findings. HARKing involves presenting any kind 
of post-hoc hypotheses in the introduction of a published 
article as if they were a priori from the beginning. At the 
time, Kerr (1998) reported that HARKing was a commonly 
used strategy to increase the publishability of one’s find-
ings. Although from the standpoint of current research 
standards HARKing is considered as an unacceptable and 
condemnable practice, it should be noted that it was once 
explicitly encouraged. Most notably, in a practical guide 
for researchers, Bem (2003) advised that
the data may be strong enough to justify 
 recentering your article around the new findings 
and  subordinating or even ignoring your original 
hypotheses [. . .]. If your results suggest a compel-
ling framework for their presentation, adopt it and 
make the most instructive finding your  centerpiece. 
(pp. 187–188) 
Obviously, there is nothing wrong with conducting 
 exploratory research per se, which should in fact occupy 
an integral and important part in a research program 
for purposes such as hypothesis generation or testing 
 auxiliary theories (McGuire, 1997). What is actually harm-
ful, scientifically speaking, is disguising exploratory and 
other unexpected findings as confirmatory results. Per-
forming extensive exploratory data analysis in a search 
for interesting yet unpredicted findings always presents 
the inherent risk of capitalizing on random sampling 
chance and consequently detecting a statistically signifi-
cant false  positive, especially when researchers’ degrees of 
freedom or other kinds of questionable research practices 
are applied. Once such exploratory effects are detected – 
regardless of whether they are actually false positives 
– they are easily transformed into post-hoc hypotheses 
given the strength of the hindsight bias that allows one to 
always find a  plausible rationale for almost any  hypothesis 
(Fischhoff, 1975). In the worst-case scenario, HARK-
ing causes a false positive to become a new (yet wrong 
from the outset) theory, which ultimately undermines 
the  quality of produced science (see Ferguson & Heene, 
2012, for a review). Given the relative high prevalence of 
 HARKing among researchers (John et al., 2012; Kerr, 1998), 
it is likely that many supposedly “unsuccessful” studies 
were actually devoted to replicating invalid, yet presented 
as confirmatory, effects. Ideally, when an interesting, but 
unexpected, finding emerges from a study, it should be 
addressed in a follow-up confirmatory one. 
The current debate on research practices might implic-
itly convey an indictment toward researchers and impute 
the responsibility for poor research quality on their shoul-
ders, assuming that they purposely applied dubious 
 procedures and hence sacrificed scientific validity over 
scientific  publishability. We do not call into question the 
ethical responsibility any scientist should endorse with 
regard to the way he or she manages data. Yet, in our view, 
it is more reasonable to assume that the large-scale preva-
lence of questionable research practices among academic 
 psychologists should be traced to a more structural cause. 
As a matter of fact, we suggest in the following sections 
that current  publication  standards actually promote these 
kinds of  questionable research practices and thus may be 
at the  origin of the replicability crisis in social psychological 
science. 
Publication Standards Promote Bad Research 
Practices
Many journals have been sensitive to replication issues 
that came along with the crisis and have consequently 
developed new criteria as standards for publication. For 
instance, increasingly more journals require addressing 
issues of sample size and statistical power, and they have 
also become open to new approaches to data analysis (e.g., 
meta-analysis, Bayesian statistics). Still, some of the cur-
rent publication standards encourage bad research prac-
tices in several ways. Arguably, the first to mention is the 
pervasive dominance of the null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) as the main tool of scientific inference 
in researchers’ statistical toolbox, along with the sancti-
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fied level of p < 0.05.2 With regard to editorial practices, 
 maintaining statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
as the sine qua non condition for publication has several 
deleterious consequences on the quality of published 
research.
First, it encourages the kind of dichotomous think-
ing in which the alpha level of 0.05 sets the boundary 
between the strict existence and non-existence of an 
effect. Cumming (2012, 2014) extensively criticized this 
reasoning by arguing that the consistency of the conclu-
sions drawn from research is better when one focuses on 
continuous effect size estimation instead of on hypothesis 
testing (see Coulson, Healey, Fidler, & Cumming, 2010). 
This is because hypothesis testing involves making black-
and-white decisions (i.e., an effect is statistically  significant 
or not) that do not take into account the numerical value 
of a point estimate of the tested effect. For instance, two 
studies addressing the same research issue can make close 
estimations of an effect size, yet only one of them reaches 
the significance threshold. In this case, the perceived 
consistency of the studies would depend on the adopted 
 analytical strategy.
Furthermore, the requirement of statistical significance 
fixed at the p < 0.05 level tends to undermine the eviden-
tial value of the published literature. On the one hand, 
recent advances in Bayesian statistics have pointed out 
that a p-value significant at 0.05 may often pertain to only 
weak evidence against the null hypothesis (Johnson, 2013; 
Wetzels et al., 2011). From this point of view,  publishing 
studies associated with a p-value as “high” as 0.05 results 
in cumulating fairly poor and unreliable evidence for the 
generated claims, which could further account for the 
low replicability rate in psychology. A recent Bayesian 
re-interpretation of the Reproducibility Project (Etz & 
Vandekerckhove, 2016) backs up this claim. While the 
authors claimed that 75 percent of replication studies 
among those that they considered provided a qualitatively 
similar amount of evidence as the original studies, the 
evidence was often weak. Indeed, out of 72 re-analyzed 
original studies, 43 (60%) represented indecisive and 
ambiguous evidence for the published effects.
On the other hand, the overemphasis on p < 0.05 as 
a prerequisite for publication ultimately biases the 
estimated magnitude of published effects. This phe-
nomenon is widely known as the “file drawer” problem 
(Fanelli, 2012; Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Rosenthal, 1979): 
Positive, statistically significant results get more eas-
ily published than negative, statistically non-significant 
results. To provide with an extreme, hypothetical version 
of this problem, Rosenthal somewhat cynically stated 
that “the journals are filled with the 5% of the studies 
that show Type I errors, while the file drawers back at 
the lab are filled with the 95% of the studies that show 
non-significant (e.g., p > 0.05) results”. (1979, p. 638). 
This issue is a straightforward consequence of one of the 
most severe limitations of the NHST procedure and has 
to do with asymmetrical decision making based on the 
p-value. Indeed, a significant p-value leads to rejection of 
the null hypothesis, while a non-significant p-value does 
not lead to acceptance of the null hypothesis (Cohen, 
1990, 1994), despite common but improper practices 
of doing so (Hoekstra, Finch, Kiers, & Johnson, 2006). A 
non-significant p-value is difficult to interpret, providing 
evidence neither against nor in favor of the null hypoth-
esis. For this reason, authors, reviewers, and editors prefer 
focusing on supposedly more conclusive, positive, and 
statistically significant results. This ultimately results in 
the disappearance of negative results from the literature 
(Fanelli, 2012). Consequently, this bias creates a structural 
incentive to search for positive results. It should then 
come as no surprise that researchers might be motivated 
to use a variety of questionable research practices, further 
engaging in self-confirmatory biases and eventually con-
vincing themselves that their findings are genuine, in a 
situation where research validity conflicts with research 
publishability. 
The file drawer problem and the resulting  publication 
bias also directly distort scientific knowledge. This is 
because whenever there is enough data available in the 
 literature relative to an effect, it is a common strategy to 
use meta-analytic procedures to try to see a “clearer image” 
in the fog of sometimes conflicting evidence. However, 
if negative results are systematically omitted from the 
publication process, the “clearer image” must necessar-
ily be distorted, especially when the omitted “negative” 
results are declared as such because of insufficient statis-
tical power and are actually Type-II errors. One can only 
speculate about the extent of this phenomenon, but in 
view of the low statistical power in many psychological 
studies (e.g., Maxwell, 2004), it is reasonable to assume 
that this situation is fairly common. As a consequence, to 
the extent that considerably more positive findings are 
available in the literature than negative ones, parameter 
estimations from meta-analyses might often be spuriously 
inflated (Rosenthal, 1979). Again, the vicious circle con-
tinues as the worst-case scenario might occur when these 
artificially inflated parameter estimations serve for power 
analyses. The overestimation of effect size in power analy-
ses can lead to underestimating the sample size needed 
to detect the effect of interest (leading to an underpow-
ered study), which increases the likelihood of committing 
a Type-II error. 
Furthermore, it should also be noted that many 
 scientific practices that easily result in false-positive find-
ings have often been encouraged by unrealistic standards 
of perfection for publication (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Indeed, 
authors are too often demanded to present an almost per-
fect match between the theoretical predictions they test 
and the empirical evidence they find in their studies. It 
is essential to keep in mind that regardless of the validity 
of a theory, sampling variability will always sprinkle data 
with some random noise. Cooper’s (2016) recent editorial 
made it clear: “Real data are messy, and imperfection (not 
perfection) should be expected” (p. 433). 
Last but not least, current editorial standards overem-
phasize the need for novelty, which also impedes the 
construction of cumulative science. Indeed, top-ranked 
journals are more inclined to accept studies highlight-
ing new and original psychological effects, with a seri-
ous cost of neglecting the importance of replications 
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(e.g., Neuliep & Crandall, 1993). The latter are still too 
often deemed as lacking prestige and inspiring  little 
 interest among researchers, and, therefore, until now, 
the studies have only been rarely conducted (Makel et al., 
2012). Likewise, the excellence of publishing new effects 
as a result of confirmatory research tends to underesti-
mate the role of  conducting exploration in one’s research 
program. This might further contribute to HARKing and 
other questionable strategies in data analysis.
Many concrete solutions have already been put for-
ward to encourage researchers to adopt research prac-
tices that could help in building cumulative science and 
contribute to overcoming the crisis. Among these, Open 
Science Collaboration (2012, 2015) and the Many Labs 
Replication Project are collaborative projects that spe-
cifically focus on replicability issues. Likewise, the Open 
Science Framework helps researchers preregister their 
studies (openscienceframework.org), which could be a 
useful tool to clearly distinguish between exploratory 
and confirmatory findings. Besides these “large-scale” 
projects, good individual research practices are the sine 
qua non condition for the quality of psychological studies 
to increase. Among such practices, one should remem-
ber to take into account the importance of statistical 
power in study design (e.g., Maxwell, 2004; Maxwell et 
al., 2008). In this regard, we can think of Cohen’s (1990) 
“less is more, except of course for sample size” (p. 1304). 
Furthermore, instead of relying solely on hypothesis test-
ing along with the p-value, adopting the meta-analytical 
thinking with parameter estimation is more than desir-
able (e.g., Stukas & Cumming, 2014). As the American 
Statistical Association has recently acknowledged, “data 
analysis should not end with the calculation of a p-value 
when other approaches are appropriate and feasible” 
(Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016, p. 132). As such, Bayesian 
statistics seem to be an interesting tool that can provide 
the strength of evidence for one’s theory (e.g., Mulder & 
Wagenmakers, 2016; Świątkowski, submitted) and cor-
roborate the null hypothesis when of theoretical  interest 
(e.g., Gallistel, 2009; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & 
Iverson, 2009). Crucially, however, one should always 
keep in mind that no single statistical index can ever sub-
stitute for well-informed scientific thinking (Gigerenzer & 
Marewski, 2015; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016).
Hidden Auxiliary Assumptions and Psychological 
Theories’ Replicability
The last perspective on the replicability crisis we want to 
discuss, one that we often find surprisingly neglected in 
the debates on replicability issues – especially in fields 
such as social psychology – pertains to the  generalizability 
of psychological theories and the external validity of 
studied effects. Within a purely confirmatory research 
paradigm, the demonstration of an effect involves assess-
ing the validity of some predictions derived from the 
theory under investigation. In a nutshell, a theory can be 
defined as a set of logical propositions that posit causal 
 relationships attempting to explain observable,  naturally 
occurring phenomena (Fiske, 2004). These logical prop-
ositions are initially broad and abstract, but they give 
rise to more concrete and specific predictions that are 
 empirically  testable. 
Supposedly, the whole point of doing science is deriv-
ing testable predictions from theories and consequently 
ruling out those that did not “work out” in line with the 
Popperian principle of refutability (Popper, 1959). Thus, 
if a theoretical conjecture predicts a specific observa-
tion, then, with respect to the modus tollens principle, 
empirically falsifying this relationship leads to falsifying 
the conjecture. This approach is often regarded as the 
golden standard of scientific inquiry and is indeed very 
popular among experimental social psychologists (Jost & 
Kruglanski, 2002). It enables making strong inference as 
to which of several competing theories should be rejected 
as being false and which deserve further investigation.3 
In practice, however, whenever a theoretical conjecture 
is subjected to empirical scrutiny, some “hidden” assump-
tions are also implicitly tested. These involve auxiliary the-
ories on the one hand (Lakatos, 1978; McGuire, 1983) and 
the empirical realization of specific conditions describing 
the experimental particulars on the other (Meehl, 1978). 
Consequently, failing to observe a predicted outcome does 
not necessarily mean that the theory itself is wrong, but 
rather that the conjunction of the theory and the under-
lying assumptions at hand are invalid (Lakatos, 1978; 
Meehl, 1978, 1990, 1997). 
For instance, imagine a study testing the impact of 
competition on cognitive performance. Based on a given 
theory, a specific prediction is made that making partici-
pants solve a cognitive task (e.g., mathematical opera-
tions) in competitive settings will have a negative impact 
on their individual performance. Having eventually failed 
to observe such a relationship in the study, one might 
end up wondering whether this result falsifies the theory, 
or whether it may actually be imputed to the nature of 
the instrument assessing the subjects’ performance (i.e., 
 auxiliary theory N°1), to the kind of population from 
which the participants were drawn (i.e., auxiliary theory 
N°2), or to the quality of the induction of the experimen-
tal treatment (i.e., empirical realization of the specific 
 condition), and so on (see Meehl, 1978). 
Quite surprisingly, most social-psychological theories 
hardly ever make any explicit mention of the auxiliary 
assumptions that are present in the process of their elabo-
ration (McGuire, 1983; see also Klein et al., 2012). Given 
the rationale outlined above, these assumptions could in 
fact be necessary to verify the predictions of a theory. This 
state of affairs might indeed seem surprising, insofar as 
social psychologists are best positioned to acknowledge 
the importance of context-dependency when studying 
human behavior. Arguably, context-dependency could 
actually play an active role in the “hidden assumptions” 
underlying many social-psychological theories. It is there-
fore reasonable to assume that context-dependency could 
also account for the unexpectedly low rate of  replicability 
in the social-psychological literature (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015; Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, 
& Reinero, 2016a, 2016b; but see also Inbar, 2016). Thus, 
apart from considerations relative to statistical power and 
false positives, it is also likely that at least some replication 
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studies fail to replicate because the auxiliary  assumptions 
regarding the context or the population-related 
 specificities of original effects were simply not met. 
Van Bavel et al. (2016b) put forward an argument giv-
ing some credit to this claim. The authors have recently 
pointed out that the replication rate discrepancy between 
social and cognitive psychology (25% vs. 53%) in the Open 
Science Collaboration’s (2015) Reproducibility Project 
could be attributed to a greater context- sensitivity of the 
former over the latter, rather than to other  methodological 
factors (e.g., effect sizes, sample sizes). While this argu-
ment does not put the validity of social-psychological 
theories in jeopardy stricto sensu, it highlights the sour 
fact that many of them may just not be as universal as 
we (social psychologists) would like them to be. Likewise, 
Sears (1986) had already emphasized long ago the fact 
that many studies in social psychology are conducted 
with college students, which may limit the extent to 
which the conclusions drawn are generalizable across 
other populations. Other widely reported cross-cultural 
differences (e.g., Hofstede & Hofstede, 2001; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) 
could also limit the  universality and ecological validity of 
 social- psychological theories. 
As a matter of fact, the conflict between the search 
for psychological universals and the social constructiv-
ist approach that circumscribes human behavior to its 
 historical and cultural context already has a long-stand-
ing  tradition in our field (see Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). In 
some way, current debates on replicability issues related to 
context-dependency echo the intellectual crisis from the 
1970s that called into question the  epistemological foun-
dations of the mainstream experimental social  psychology 
(e.g., Gergen, 1973). Once again, we are faced with the same 
dilemma of whether the goal of  establishing  universal 
laws that experimental social  psychology strives to  pursue 
(Norenzayan & Heine, 2005) is ultimately  attainable, given 
that the object of study – human beings – is  necessarily 
situated in a particular context.
Bringing Social Psychology Back to its Name: 
Toward a Perspectivist Social Psychology
At this stage, one may wonder about the objective of 
performing replication studies – or any study at all, 
actually(!) – since they can never lead to rejecting the 
tested  hypothesis. This is because a failure to observe 
the predicted outcome can always give rise to some “ad 
hoc explanations” (Meehl, 1967, p. 114) pertaining to 
hidden assumptions that moderate the validity of the 
effects under scrutiny. Indeed, the popperian falsifiability 
requirement is hardly fulfilled in a field where observing 
a  theory-consistent outcome corroborates the theory, but 
where it is a priori known that observing a theory-incon-
sistent outcome will not imply theory rejection (Meehl, 
1978). The ambiguous nature of a non-significant p-value, 
based on which psychologists predominantly make their 
inferences, may be at least partly responsible for this 
problem. A non-significant p-value provides neither evi-
dence for nor against the null  hypothesis, and even when 
the latter is true, the p-value can take almost any value 
( Cumming, 2012; Dienes, 2011).4 Thus, even when a 
 theory lacks empirical support and when failed attempts 
at replication accumulate, it is still hardly possible to 
properly operate the falsification mechanism, and this 
without even mentioning the fact that publication bias 
may prevent failed replications to be published (Ferguson 
& Heene, 2012). 
Clear criteria about the most crucial aspect in theory 
construction – falsifiability – are indeed not consensual in 
social psychology (e.g., Trafimow, 2009; Wallach & Wallach, 
2010). In the long run, the lack of a viable falsification 
procedure seriously undermines the quality of  scientific 
knowledge psychology produces. Without a way to build 
a cumulative net of well-tested theories and to abandon 
those that are false, social psychology risks ending up with 
a confused mixture of both instead. With regard to this 
matter, Meehl (1978) had already emphasized that 
in the developed sciences, theories tend either to 
become widely accepted and built into the larger 
edifice of well-tested human knowledge or else 
they suffer destruction in the face of recalcitrant 
facts and are abandoned, perhaps regretfully as a 
“nice try”. But in fields like personology and social 
psychology, this seems not to happen. There is a 
period of enthusiasm about a new theory, a period 
of attempted application to several fact domains, 
a period of disillusionment as the negative data 
come in, a growing bafflement about inconsistent 
and unreplicable empirical results, multiple resort 
to ad hoc excuses, and then finally people just 
sort of lose interest in the thing and pursue other 
endeavors. (p.807)
Before the temptation gets too strong to say that 
 psychological science is in the end a pointless endeavor 
– as it has apparently no ultimate tool for distinguishing 
“good” from “bad” theories – one may wish to consider 
a possible response to this paradox that was put forward 
by William McGuire. In his contextualist approach to 
knowledge construction (McGuire, 1983), later labeled 
as  perspectivism (McGuire, 1989, 1999, 2004), the prob-
lem of auxiliary assumptions in empirical assessment of 
theoretical conjectures is handled by acknowledging their 
integral role in the process of theory elaboration. Here, the 
“hidden” auxiliary assumptions that condition the extent 
to which a theory is generalizable are not considered as a 
problem, but rather as a means in the “discovery process 
to make clear the meaning of the [theory], disclosing its 
hidden assumptions and thus clarifying circumstances 
under which the [theory] is true and those under which 
it is false” (McGuire, 1983, p. 7). McGuire’s perspectivist 
epistemology is strongly rooted in logical empiricism5 
as it builds upon some of its core postulates, but it also 
 radically departs from others.
On the a priori side, perspectivism agrees with  logical 
empiricism that researchers should conduct their research 
based on theoretically embedded hypotheses that guide 
their observations and organize data (McGuire, 1999). 
However, the perspectivist innovation stresses the 
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importance of accounting the same hypothesis by  multiple 
theories and also formulating contrary hypotheses along 
with the theories from which they can be derived. This 
innovation stems from McGuire’s (1983, 1999) basic 
assumption that every form of knowledge must neces-
sarily be an incomplete picture of reality because its very 
nature of representation cannot completely account for 
the complexity of environment. Therefore, one single 
phenomenon could always be accounted for by multiple 
hypotheses driven from multiple theories, even contradic-
tory ones. On the a posteriori side, perspectivism follows 
logical empiricism’s premise regarding the importance 
of confronting theoretical predictions with empirical 
reality. However, perspectivism goes further by consider-
ing empirical assessment not only as test of whether the 
initial hypothesis is true, but also as a tool in strategic 
research planning (McGuire, 1999).
On the other hand, perspectivism diverges from  logical 
empiricism in two crucial instances. First, instead of 
 traditionally assuming that some theories are true and 
others false, perspectivism holds that all theories are 
both true and false, depending precisely on the conjunc-
tion that is met between the theory and the underly-
ing  auxiliary assumptions that are involved in empirical 
testing (McGuire, 1983). This position radically departs 
from the commonly endorsed point of view in which 
a researcher seeks to establish theoretical  universality 
by managing to fail all possible attempts of theory 
 falsification. Perspectivism rather asserts that identifying 
and making clear the “hidden” auxiliary assumptions that 
circumscribe a theory in a more explicit context of validity 
and generalizability contributes to theory understanding 
and full appreciation of its richness. 
The second peculiarity of the perspectivist approach 
that follows is continuity – and not contrast – between 
the exploratory stage (i.e., hypothesis generation) and 
the confirmatory stage (i.e., empirical assessment) within 
a research program (McGuire, 1983). Conventionally, 
hypotheses are generated at an exploratory step of a 
research program to later be put under scrutiny and an 
empirical falsification, hence yielding a black-or-white 
outcome. Instead, perspectivism asserts that the confron-
tation between a hypothesis and empirical assessment “is 
not so much a testing of the hypothesis as it is a continuing 
revelation of its full meaning made apparent by its pattern 
of confirmations and disconfirmations in a strategically 
programmed set of observable situations” (McGuire, 1983, 
p. 14). Thus, the hypothesis-testing phase also contributes 
to theory construction by providing empirical insight 
through exploratory research. The perspectivist approach 
emphasizes the fact that exploration and confirmation 
should be equally important: One should follow the other 
within the same research program so as to make the pro-
cess of scientific discovery more circular. The following 
section provides an illustration on how perspectivism can 
give rise to systematic strategic planning and help develop 
a positive research agenda. 
At the conceptual level, building a perspectivist 
research program (McGuire, 1983, 1989, 2004) starts with 
the formulation of an initial hypothesis about a possible 
relationship between two variables of interest. This initial 
hypothetical insight is then explored using a stepwise 
procedure. As a first step, one can explore the meaning 
of the variables, for instance, by using word games and 
synonyms, to identify alternative labels as well as several 
possible working definitions for each of them. Whereas 
the initial hypothesis relies to some extent on intuitive 
choices, this verbal exploration enables the researcher 
to define consciously and precisely the nature of the 
variables under investigation among a set of possible 
alternatives. 
Once the appropriate labels and working definitions 
are selected, the relationship between the two variables 
is expressed through various modalities (e.g., verbal, 
 graphical, statistical) that allow the researcher to think 
about the relationship without relying on a unique and 
too restrictive representation. Then, multiple explana-
tions for the relationship are formulated to create several 
mediational hypotheses, assuming that only one process 
cannot fully explain it. In addition, several moderators can 
be identified with the goal of defining the boundaries of 
the relationship and those of its explanations. 
Finally, since perspectivism assumes that any  hypothesis 
is true within some specific contexts, the hypothesis con-
trary to the initial one also has to be explored by searching 
for several possible mediators and moderators that could 
apply to it. McGuire (1997) developed a set of 49 crea-
tive heuristics to help researchers go through this step 
of planning and developing original hypotheses for their 
research.
Taken as a whole, this procedure enables the researcher 
to create a set of well-defined hypotheses that predict 
the conditions in which, as well as the processes through 
which, the initial hypothesis and its contrary are expected 
to be valid. Figure 1 illustrates the general structure of a 
theoretical model based on these guidelines.
Even if endorsing perspectivism in theory construction 
may appear at first glance as a potential source of confusion 
Figure 1: A hypothetical example of a theoretical model 
derived through the perspectivist approach (based on 
Jost, Banaji, & Prentice, 2004, pp. 319–332).
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due to the introduction of a high level of  complexity in 
theoretical reasoning, it offers a broader view of the con-
ditions of validity of expected effects and thus impacts 
the type of research to be conducted  empirically. Rather 
than running research based on a vague  theoretical con-
ceptualization containing an unknown number of hidden 
 auxiliary assumptions, perspectivism invites researchers to 
first start by conducting highly selective studies that focus 
on some key parts of the overall model. Then, subsequent 
studies should be guided by this a priori framework, but 
also by the findings obtained by previous research. In this 
respect, empirical confrontation serves not only to test a 
priori hypotheses but plays an active role in the discovery 
process through exploratory research. Importantly, if this 
exploratory step leads to discovering new, relevant, and 
meaningful relationships (e.g., a post-hoc moderator of a 
hypothesis), these relationships should then be addressed 
in follow-up confirmatory studies. In this way, one can 
clearly see that the perspectivist process of  knowledge con-
struction is a continuous interplay between  confirmation 
and exploration.
In sum, we believe that a wider endorsement of the 
 perspectivist approach in social psychology would 
 positively relate to the replicability rate of published stud-
ies. First, as we already mentioned, emphasizing auxiliary 
assumptions that are present throughout the process 
of theory construction and empirical assessment would 
allow making clear boundary conditions to a theory’s 
validity. Thus, contexts where a theory is expected to hold 
true can be anticipated for attempts of replication, which 
is likely to increase the chances of success. Furthermore, 
because perspectivism gives researchers legitimate rea-
sons to expect that a theory might not hold true in a par-
ticular context, theoretically meaningful predictions on 
the absence of an effect can be made. In other words, the 
perspectivist agenda could increase the extent to which 
researchers focus on corroborating the null  hypothesis. 
This, in turn, could provide an extra argument for 
 publishing “null” results and hence bring some balance in 
the published literature between “positive” and “negative” 
findings (see also Dienes, 2016).
A possible criticism of perspectivism would be to 
argue that the endorsement of this approach can lead to 
an extremist position where one considers that literally 
every proposition can be considered as true if the appro-
priate context had been found. For instance, if we push 
the perspectivist argument to its extreme, should we not 
consider that even highly implausible propositions – such 
as Bem’s (2009) results on extra-sensory perceptions or 
Simmons et al.’s (2011) spurious effect of age change by 
listening to music – could be true in some very particular 
contexts? Actually, should some kinds of hypotheses not 
be discarded a priori instead of retained in the hope that 
some context might be found in which they hold true? Is 
there not a threat to perspectivism’s validity?
We do not think this is the case. Perspectivism asserts 
that every hypothesis is both right and wrong as a func-
tion of context. For this context to be investigated, a 
hypothesis must be deductively derived from a  coherent 
theoretical system so that speculations can be made about 
the mechanism involved. An explanatory  mechanism for 
a hypothesis can then be predicted to hold in some con-
texts and not in others. After a closer inspection, one real-
izes that such an inquiry is not possible with propositions 
like those of Bem (2009) or Simmons et al. (2011)  simply 
because they do not rely on a hypothesis based on a the-
ory. In other words, these are not genuine  hypotheses 
that could be studied with the perspectivist approach, 
which applies only to hypothetico-deductive proposi-
tions. Without a theory, no claim about the underlying 
 mechanism accounting for a proposition can be made. 
Hence, there is no way to identify contexts in which it 
could or not hold. Consequently, an a priori  rejection 
of an ungrounded claim’s validity – regardless of its 
 plausibility – does not conflict with the endorsement of 
perspectivism.
On the other hand, we do not believe that hypoth-
eses consistent with the existing body of knowledge 
should be ruled out for being a priori – that is, without 
 empirical investigation – deemed false in every context. 
First, because science should be about constructing 
knowledge based on confrontation between hypothetical 
 conjectures with empirical tests and not based on per-
sonal or  ideological beliefs. Second, because as long as one 
deals with a genuine theory, that is, a coherent system of 
causal relationships that obeys the rules of formal logic, 
there is no possible a priori way to establish its falsehood 
(i.e., without subjecting it to empirical test). Moreover, 
as we argued throughout the article, it is not even pos-
sible to establish absolute falsehood based on empirical 
assessment (hence the value of perspectivism). While 
perspectivism asserts that all hypotheses hold both true 
and false depending on contexts under consideration, 
it does not mean that every theory should be endlessly 
pursued if one fails to find a sufficiently interesting and 
relevant context for the theory to be true. Abandoning 
theories that “do not work out” is part of doing science. 
However, such decisions cannot be solely accounted by 
purely logical criteria. They depend on  sociological and 
psychological factors proper to a  scientific community 
(Kuhn, 1962). Each scientific  community endorses its 
own set of values that are relevant in  evaluating theories 
(e.g., degree of precision, range of application, simplicity, 
fruitfulness, etc.) and that guide scholars in their choices 
of which theory is worth  investigating and which is not 
(Chalmers, 1982).
Finally, one should not forget that, in the perspectivist 
approach, social psychology could ultimately be viewed as 
a form of philosophy that has no pretense of describing 
the outside world. Every hypothesis could be regarded as 
being limited by a specific set of “perspectives”, outside of 
which the hypothesis would no longer hold. Perspectivist 
social psychology could thus be considered as a contem-
plative approach to knowledge construction, where the 
richness of the theory – rather than its validity – can 
become an end in itself. We hope however to have made 
a compelling case that adopting this approach would be 
beneficial for our field. In essence, it urges the researcher 
to anticipate and make overt necessary auxiliary assump-
tions within a strategically planned research program.
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Conclusion
In this article, we have sought to address the current issue 
of the replicability crisis in social psychology. First, we 
made a state of the art of this crisis and exposed some 
of the most emphatic and illustrative examples of its 
occurrence. We then shed light on the causes that are, 
in our sense, the most likely to have spawned the crisis. 
 Specifically, we pointed out that the recurrent issue of low 
statistical power in studies in social psychology may be 
at least partly responsible for the low rate of replicability 
in the domain. We argued that the prevalent use of ques-
tionable research practices (John et al., 2012), researcher’s 
degrees of freedom (Simmons et al., 2011), and HARKing 
(Kerr, 1998) can also account for the replicability crisis. We 
then emphasized the fact that current publication stand-
ards may promote such bad practices, leading to delete-
rious consequences on the published literature. Among 
these, we discussed the problematic use of the null 
hypothesis significance testing and the associated require-
ment of a p < 0.05 as a condition of publication, along 
with  unrealistic expectations regarding  researchers’ data 
and the need for novelty (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Finally, 
we also pointed out that the neglect of possible auxiliary 
assumptions relative to context-dependency variables 
could also account for an unexpectedly low rate of repli-
cability in the domain of social psychology (Van Bavel et 
al., 2016b). With regard to the latter issue, we argued that 
shifting toward a more perspectivist social  psychology 
could be beneficial to improve the replicability of studies 
in social psychology. 
In our view, a greater reliance on perspectivism in social 
psychology could be greatly beneficial for the field. Arguably, 
making explicit the assumptions and the contexts in which 
postulated theories hold and those in which they do not 
could be a great step toward improving the replicability rate 
of social psychological theories. As a first step toward this 
improvement, authors should remember to always include 
relevant information about their samples when reporting 
their studies, beyond participants’ sex and age (e.g., country 
of origin, academic section for students). Likewise, the social 
context in which the studies were conducted (e.g., type of 
social interactions between experimenters and participants 
during or before the experiment, presence of incentive or 
reward) should also be described with more details than 
what is currently done in most papers. In this regard, Klein 
et al. (2012) provided a list of guidelines for specifying some 
methodological information useful for determining bound-
ary conditions of assessed effects.
Obviously, there is no such thing as a free lunch. 
Acknowledging the importance of auxiliary assumptions 
in theory elaboration and testing puts into question 
one’s theory’s universality. On the other hand, however, 
it is precisely the desire and aspirations for theoretical 
 universality that might have partly led to the apparent 
 crisis in our field in the first place. In our view, it is more 
reasonable to assume that many of our theories are sub-
ject to contextual and cultural dependency. This should, 
after all, come as no surprise for researchers from the field 
that includes “social” in its name.
Notes
 1 Power analysis can be easily performed with the freely 
available G*Power 3 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007).
 2 We hasten to make clear that this statistical tool is 
not bad per se, contrary to what might be thought 
based on the recent debates on the difficulties asso-
ciated with p-values (e.g., Branch, 2014; Trafimow & 
Marks, 2015). Rather, it is the way NHST is typically 
used in social  sciences in general that would require 
a thorough reconsideration (see Gigerenzer, 2004; 
 Gigerenzer, Krauss, & Vitouch, 2004).
 3 According to the Popperian epistemology, scientific 
theories cannot be proven to be true but only to be 
false (see Chalmers, 1982, and Dienes, 2008, for a 
review). This asymmetry stems from the fact that 
observing a  theory-consistent observation cannot 
deductively lead to confirming the theory, but a the-
ory-inconsistent observation can deductively lead 
to disconfirming the theory. Thus, a tested theory 
can either be rejected if it is  falsified by empirical 
test or not be rejected (i.e.,  corroborated but not 
confirmed) if it survives the attempt of falsification. 
Popper argued that focusing on refuting theories 
would ensure the progress of  science because the-
ories that survive attempts of  falsification tend to 
converge to the truth, even though the latter can-
not be ultimately attained (Popper, 1969, as cited in 
Chalmers, 1982).
 4 P-values can be used to falsify predictions in equiva-
lence testing (Rogers, Howard, & Vessey, 1993), yet 
even those are still hardly ever performed in the 
 psychological literature.
 5 Logical empiricism – also referred to as logical 
 positivism – is a movement in philosophy of science 
that was founded at the beginning of the 20th  century 
by a group of scientists and philosophers called 
Vienna Circle (Wienerkreis). Within this approach 
to  scientific construction of knowledge, research-
ers should derive their hypotheses from empirically 
anchored  theoretical systems to then be subjected 
to empirical tests (see Dienes, 2008, and McGuire, 
1983, 1999, for a review). Although logical empiri-
cism is not the dominant approach in philosophy of 
science anymore, it still has been very influential in 
psychology across the second half of the last century 
(McGuire, 1999).
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